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MORGAN KOUSSER'S NOBLE DREAM*

Hea the r K. Ge rken**
COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE
UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION. By J. Morgan Kousser.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1999. Pp. x, 590.
$29.95.
J. Morgan Kousser, professor of history and social science at the
California Institute of Technology, is an unusual academic. He enjoys
the respect of two quite different groups - historians and civil rights
litigators. As a historian, Kousser has written a number of important
works on the American South in the tradition of his mentor, C. Vann
Woodward,1 including a foundational book on southern political his
tory, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the
Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910. Many of his writings
have become seminal texts among election law scholars.2 Kousser has
also used his historical skills to provide crucial assistance to civil rights
plaintiffs in numerous voting cases, including Mobile v. Bolden, Shaw
v . Hunt, and Bush v . Vera .3
* This title is taken from Peter Novick's famous book on the debate about objectivity
among American historians. See PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY
QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988). Novick himself bor
rowed the phrase from Theodore Clarke Smith. Id. at vii. Novick has a special gift for coin
ing a title, as his rebuttal to critics of That Noble Dream demonstrates. See Peter Novick, My
Correct Views on Everything, 96 AM . HIST. REV. 699 (1991).
** Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. B.A. 1991, Princeton; J.D. 1994, University
of Michigan. - Ed. This Review has benefited from close reads by David Barron, Christine
Desan, Lani Guinier, Morton Horwitz, Richard Parker, Richard Pildes, David Simon, and
William Stuntz, as well as from discussions with Pamela Karlan, Duncan Kennedy, Samuel
Issacharoff, and Kenneth Mack. Thanks also to Morgan Kousser for his gracious response to
this Review. Alison Caplis and Michael Gottlieb provided very helpful research assistance.
All mistakes are, of course, my own.
1. P. 11; see also infra notes 39, 93 (identifying connections between Kousser's scholar
ship and the writings of C. Vann Woodward).
2. For example, virtually every relevant chapter of one of the two main election law
texts contains extensive references to Kousser's writings. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 78 (ch. 2), 465 (ch. 7), 475 (ch. 7), 602 n.52 (ch. 8) (1998).
3. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 910 (1996); Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614,
619 (11th Cir. 1984), affd, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1329
(S.D. Tex. 1994), affd sub nom, Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); DeBaca v. San Diego,
794 F. Supp. 990, 997 (S.D. Ca. 1992), affd per curium, No. 92-55661, 1993 WL 379838 (4th
Cir. Sept. 27, 1993); Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (C.D. Cal.
1990); Harry v. Bladen County, 1989 WL 253428, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 1989); Brown v.
Bd. of Comm'rs, 722 F. Supp. 380, 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); United States v. Dallas County
Comm'n, 548 F. Supp. 875, 886 (S.D. Ala. 1982), modified, 739 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984);
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Like the work of C. Vann Woodward, Kousser's is the scholarship
of the path not taken. He seeks to show that the political and racial
climate at various points in our history was more fluid than we imag
ine in order to persuade us that the path we eventually took was not
foreordained, and that changes in institutional structures or legal rules
might have led to dramatically different results. His historical scholar
ship is thus forward-looking - the past provides a means to chart our
course for the future.
Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the
Second Reconstruction is Kousser's most recent effort to pursue his
noble dream: "tell[ing] the truth and do[ing] good at the same time."4
Its self-proclaimed goal is to employ rigorous historical analysis to un
cover what Kousser believes to be the partisanship, racism, and hypoc
risy underlying the Supreme Court's racial gerrymandering decisions
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny. 5 Throughout the book, Kousser in
sists that scholars abandon their isolationist impulses and join him in
fighting the good fight to eliminate Shaw. One can only admire the
passion and intellectual firepower Kousser brings to his role as aca
demic warrior, his choice of interdisciplinary scholarship as a weapon,
and the battles he has chosen to wage.
Kousser's attack on Shaw has two prongs. In the first part of the
book, he marshals powerful historical research to show why Shaw fails
to take into account past and present realities. The second half of the
book contains Kousser's direct attack upon Shaw. It consists of a wide
ranging series of challenges to the Supreme Court's equal protection
decisions, all of which are designed to show us that Shaw reflects a
racist, pro-Republican agenda.
Ironically, the first half of Colorblind Injustice, which largely in
volves an indirect challenge to Shaw, is far more successful than the
direct attack contained in the second half. As Part I of this Review ex
plains, the first section of the book offers a good example of the politi
cal use to which history can be put. The first six chapters demonstrate
the intricate ways in which race is refracted and reflected in American
politics and the powerful effect legal rules and political institutions
-

Taylor v. Haywood County, Tenn., 544 F. Supp. 1122, 1125 (W.D. Tenn. 1982); QUIET
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965-1990, 401
n.52 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994). Indeed, five of the book's chap
ters in Colorblind Injustice stem directly from the expert witness testimony Kousser pro
vided. P. 2.
4. J. Morgan Kousser, Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on Objectivity in
Scholarship and Expert Witnessing, 6 PUB . HISTORIAN, Winter 1984, at 5, 7.
5. The Supreme Court's racial gerrymander cases began with Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
360 (1993), in which the Supreme Court first announced that certain majority-minority dis
tricts could be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, depending on how they were
drawn. Since 1993, the Supreme Court has struck down a number of majority-minority dis
tricts throughout the country. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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have upon race relations. By revealing the many complexities the
Shaw decisions elide, Kousser's historical research provides a weighty
challenge to the formalist reasoning offered by Shaw and its progeny.
Part II argues that Kousser's direct challenge to Shaw in the sec
ond half of Colorblind Injustice fails in large part because he does not
adequately articulate or defend the normative theory undergirding his
challenge. The omission is a deliberate one, as Kousser believes that it
is "facts, not theories, that really matter" (p. 504 n.33). As Section II.A
explains, however, the attack Kousser levies is necessarily a normative
one. Because he fails to defend his normative premises, however, they
are difficult to discern, obvious criticisms of those assumptions go un
answered, and he never engages directly with the difficult normative
questions Shaw raises. Section II.B argues that even if Kousser is
merely trying to downplay, rather than eliminate, normative argument
in equal protection, that undertaking is misguided. Indeed, decision
making that is not anchored to a clear normative principle lends itself
to a different variant of the formalism Kousser decries.
Finally, Part III briefly reflects upon the language Kousser uses to
advocate his cause. It criticizes Kousser's fiery rhetoric on purely in
strumental grounds. While there is certainly much to be said for intro
ducing righteous indignation into this debate, Kousser is unlikely to
achieve his political aims with the language he has chosen. This Re
view concludes by noting that this book undoubtedly should be read
by anyone interested in the ongoing debate about Shaw v. Reno and
its progeny, but it is unlikely to change anyone's mind.
I.

THE STRUGGLE OF MEMORY AGAINST FORGETTING

The first half of Colorblind Injustice provides a fine example of the
use of history to pursue political aims. Its goal is to show why the
Supreme Court should abandon the Shaw doctrine, which allows
majority-minority districts to be invalidated under the Equal Protec
tion Clause, depending on how they are drawn.6 By ignoring the sig
nificant role race plays in our present and recent past, Kousser argues,
the Shaw doctrine threatens the fragile gains made by racial minorities
during the Civil Rights Movement.7 Unless the Court "get[s] the his
tory right," Kousser writes, it "cannot get the equal protection clause
right" (p. 456).
Colorblind Injustice thus takes its place within an important schol
arly tradition: "the struggle of memory against forgetting," to borrow
6. Pp. 6-7; see supra note 5.
7. Pp. 6, 465-67. Kousser terms this historical period "the Second Reconstruction." As
Kousser explains, his use of the term is more than a "rhetorical flourish"; it ·highlights his
efforts to conduct a "systematic comparison" between these two key periods in United
States history. P. 2.
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Milan Kundera's lovely phrase.8 Those who subscribe to this tradition
do so for forward-looking reasons; they seek "to make connections
with the past in order to illuminate the problems of the present and
the potential of the future. "9 History is worth fighting over because the
past is "used to sanction or sanctify authority"10 and provides the
means by which we define ourselves and our community.11 Thus, his
tory "doesn't just reflect; it provides a forum for readjudicating power
and interests."12
Like Kousser, legal scholars in this tradition fear the Rehnquist
Court's resort to abstract principles in equal protection cases because
it allows the Court to ignore how these principles are refracted and
distorted when applied in the real world.13 Recognizing that it is espe
cially "[i]n the freighted area of race and public policy" that "abstract

8. MILAN KUNDERA, THE BOOK OFLAUGHTER AND FORGETTING 3 (1986). Kundera
describes this task as the "struggle of man against power" and warns that "the first step in
liquidating a people . . . is to erase its memory" so that the nation "will forget what it is and
what it was." Id. at 159. For a recent example of this type of effort in voting rights scholar
ship, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 295, 297 (2000) (seeking renewed discussion of Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475
(1903), which has "been airbrushed out of the constitutional canon").
Although Kundera was most familiar with the deliberate erasure of the past by Commu
nist dictatorships in Eastern Europe, many have remarked upon a similar, far less systematic
tendency in the United States. See c. VANN WOODWARD, THE FUTURE OF THE PAST 18-19
(1989) [hereinafter WOODWARD, FUTURE OF THE PAST) (discussing Thomas Jefferson and
Alexis de Tocqueville's views on the tendency of Americans to break with the past); C.
Vann Woodward, Thinking Back: The Perils of Writing History 3 (1986) [hereinafter
Woodward, Thinking Back] (citing an Ibsen quote favored by Holmes to a similar effect).
Others have written about the American propensity to erase the past in more positive terms.
See PHILIP FISHER, STILL THE NEW WORLD (1999) (describing this tendency as a never
ending process of reinvention). For an effort to compare attitudes about the past in the
United States and Eastern Europe, see Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn't Count:
The 2000 Election and the Failure of the Rule of Law, 149 U. PAL. REV. 1363 (forthcoming
May 2001) (arguing that constitutional interpretation reflects the efforts of what she terms
"post-horror countries" - those countries that have recently experienced mass abuse of
their own citizens - to avoid the erasure of their own histories).
9. JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 10 (1994); see also
Joyce Appleby, The Power of History, 102 AM . HIST. REV. 1, 1 (1998).
10. Morton J. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1825 (1987) [hereinafter
Horwitz, History and Theory]; C. Vann Woodward, The Future of the Past, 75 AM . HIST.
REV. 711, 724 (1970); see also APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 9, at 308; Appleby, supra note 9,
at 1; Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Funda
mentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 40 (1992) [hereinafter Horwitz, Constitution of Change].
11. Appleby, supra note 9, at 10; WOODWARD, FUTURE OF THE PAST, supra note 8, at
viii. For examples of how these observations play out in practice, see C. VANN WOODWARD,
AMERICAN COUNTERPOINT: SLAVERY AND RACISM IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE 5-9
(1971); Pildes, supra note 8, at 295, 319 n.11.
12.

APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 9,

at 289.

13. See Horwitz, Constitution of Change, supra note 10, at 98-109; Morton J. Horwitz,
The Warren Court: Rediscovering rhe Link Between Law and Culture, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
450, 456 (1988) [hereinafter Horwitz, The Warren Court]; Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite"
in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 550 (1995).
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principles [can] founder on uncomfortable facts,"14 many of these
scholars praise the Warren Court for its "rediscovery of the insepara
ble connection between political culture and political equality."15
A.

The Role ofBright-Line Rules in the Courts' Voting Jurisprudence

Concerns about acontextual decisionmaking are especially apt in
the voting rights context. A rigid adherence to bright-line rules seems
to be the usual reaction of courts to the difficulties involved in concep
tualizing how to allocate political power fairly among voters, the ten
sions between traditional tenets of liberalism and the aggregative as
pects of voting, and the types of judgments necessary to guarantee
racial minorities a full opportunity to participate in the political proc
ess.16 Courts shy away from nuanced, contextual analysis and qualita
tive evaluation, preferring instead formulaic approaches that require
only quantitative judgments. Whether one thinks the courts' resort to
formalism stems from a healthy fear of traveling farther into the po
litical thicket or is simply an ineffective attempt to dodge these ques
tions, it is hard to deny its presence in voting rights jurisprudence.17
Bright-line rules can, of course, provide sensible proxies for
achieving broader substantive aims. The problem in voting rights ju
risprudence, however, is that too often courts have stopped treating
these bright-line rules as means to an end; the rules have become ends
unto themselves. A resort to this variant of "formalism" inevitably re
sults in the mindless application of these rules to historical and norma
tive contexts where they do not fit. The average judge prefers such a
formal approach to probing the rule's normative underpinnings or fac
tual assumptions and evaluating whether they still hold in the case be
fore her.
14. Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1391 (1995); see
also Horwitz, The Warren Court, supra note 13, at 456.
15. Horwitz, The Warren Court, supra note 13, at 456.
16. See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court's New Equal Protection Jurisprudence:
A Comment on the Contributions of Richard Hasen and Richard Briffault to FSU's Bush v.
Gore Symposium, 29 FL A. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001); Heather K. Gerken, Under
standing the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1731-32 (2001) (hereinaf
ter Gerken, Undiluted Vote]; Pamela S. Karlan, Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
TEXAS L. REV. 1705 (1993). I disagree with Kousser to the extent that he views the
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence as a sharp break with the past. Whereas I believe that a
formalist streak can be identified in virtually every generation of voting rights cases, see infra
Part 11.B, Kousser identifies what he calls a "pragmatic tradition" in voting rights law prior
to the Rehnquist Court. See J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the
Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 551, 554 (1993).
17. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n,
502 U.S. 491 (1992); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). I do not mean to suggest that
formalism is always present in voting rights jurisprudence. To the contrary, the courts can
and do engage in contextual analysis in deciding equal protection claims. See, e.g., White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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One example of this trend outside of the Shaw line of cases is the
courts' section 2 jurisprudence. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
prohibits racial vote dilution.18 In the early stages of the doctrine's de
velopment, courts assessed whether racial minorities had a fair oppor
tunity to participate in the political process by examining a wide range
of historical and qualitative concerns. These came to be known as the
"Senate factors" after they were endorsed in a Senate report accom
panying the 1982 amendments to section 2.19
Over the years, however, courts resolving section 2 claims have
largely abandoned the qualitative analysis required by the Senate fac
tors. Indeed, in 1986, the Supreme Court effectively instructed lower
courts to disregard those qualitative measures and focus instead on the
three Gingles preconditions,20 mechanical proxies for assessing
whether racial minorities' potential voting strength has been under
mined. Thus, even without some qualitative proof of dilution, plain
tiffs were very likely to persuade a court to invalidate a redistricting
scheme as long as they succeeded in satisfying the Gingles precondi
tions.21
While the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. DeGrandy22
seemed to breathe new life into the Senate factors, it failed to deter
the courts' marked proclivity for mechanical, quantitative rules. Al
though the Court specifically reminded courts to pay attention to the
18. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), pre
vents states from taking advantage of racially polarized voting among whites and racial mi
norities to undermine the voting strength of minority group members. For a detailed analysis
of the right to an undiluted vote, see Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 16.
19. See S. REP NO. 97-417, at 23 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. 177, 200-01. The
Senate factors were pulled from a variety of dilution cases arising prior to 1982. See, e.g.,
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5 th Cir. 1979),
affd per curium sub nom, E. Carroll Parish Sch. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). They in
clude:
[T)he history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the extent
to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized; the
extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that
tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as un
usually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet
voting; the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; the
extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such
as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in
the political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the
extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the ju

risdiction

.

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45 (1986).
20. According to Thornburg v. Gingles, plaintiffs must prove that (1) the state could
have drawn an additional, compact majority-minority district but failed to do so; (2) the mi
nority group is politically "cohesive" - that is, its members vote in a similar fashion; and (3)
the white electorate votes as a bloc, thus enabling whites usually to defeat the minority
group's prefe.rred candidates at the polls. 478 U.S. at 50-51.
21. See Jenkins v. Red Clay Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1135 (3rd Cir. 1993).
22 . 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
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Senate factors,23 it offered a new standard for evaluating dilution proportionality - that was equally amenable to mechanical imple
mentation. Proportionality is an easily applied mathematical standard
that requires a court to count the number of districts group members
are capable of controlling on election day24 rather than examine the
quality of representation they ultimately receive. Unsurprisingly, de
spite the Supreme Court's insistence that proportionality is not a "safe
harbor" for defendants,25 courts have begun to grant "extremely heavy
weight" to proportionality in assessing dilution claims.26
A particularly striking example of this new approach is Barnett v.
City of Chicago. 27 There, the Seventh Circuit ignored virtually all of
the qualitative measures of representation, including the nine Senate
factors that were once the touchstone of any dilution claim. It based a
finding of section 2 liability entirely upon the State's failure to provide
an exact proportional share of districts to African-American voters. It
is not surprising that courts like the Seventh Circuit have moved to
ward a mechanical approach to section 2 claims. The Senate Factors
require courts to make judgments about the continuing effects of past
discrimination, the quality of representation received by racial minori
ties, the substantive content of their policy preferences, the constitu
tive aspects of participation, and the dynamics of the legislative proc
ess. All of these issues, in turn, require contextualized judgments
about race relations, the preferences of members of different racial
groups, and the allocation of political power - assessments judges are
often reluctant to make.
There are costs, however, to adopting the more mechanical, formal
approach to voting claims that we see in recent section 2 cases. First,
proportionality becomes an end unto itself rather than a means to an
end (here, a well-functioning democracy). Courts may thus neglect
other essential aspects of the democratic process. For example, under
the current approach to section 2, courts tend to "see a single event
[the election] as the culmination of political participation and the fo
cus of voting rights efforts. "28 Second, rigid adherence to a formal ap23. Id. at 1011-12.
24. See id. (announcing the proportionality standard).
25. Id. at 1017.
26. See, e.g., African Am. Voting Rights Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 54 F.3d 1345,
1356 (8th Cir. 1995); Rural W. Tenn. African-Am. Affairs Council, Inc. v. McWherter, 877 F.
Supp. 1096, 1100-03 (W.D. Tenn. 1995), affd mem. sub nom, 516 U.S. 801 (1995).
27. 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998).
28. Kathryn Abrams, Relationships or Representation in Voting Rights Act Jurispru
dence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1993); see also Judith Reed, Sense and Nonsense: Stand
ing in Racial Districting Cases as a Window on the Supreme Court's View of the Right to Vote,
4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 389, 441, 450 (1999). Kathryn Abrams and Pam Karlan have used the
Senate factors as a counterpoint to their criticisms of the formulaic approach of current dilu
tion doctrine, which they argue focuses too heavily on electoral outcomes at the expense of
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proach tends to foreclose certain types of equal protection claims sim
ply because the discrimination is not the type of harm the bright-line
rule was designed to address.29 In the long run, voting rights jurispru
dence may be so distanced from voting realities that equal protection
loses its power to effect meaningful change and may work in counter
productive ways when applied.
B.

What History Tells Us About Shaw

All of these concerns animate Kousser's challenge to the formal
ism readily identifiable in the Supreme Court's Shaw decisions. Shaw
is mistaken, Kousser argues, because it substitutes empty rhetoric and
rigid rules for nuanced, contextual analysis (p. 7). In this sense, Shaw
is part of the trend toward formalism we see in other voting rights
cases. Kousser's main focus is what he sees as the Court's rigid adher
ence to the rule of colorblindness. And despite his apparent accep
tance of Miller's predominant factor standard,30 his historical analysis
provides an equally powerful case against the application of conven
tional motive-based equal protection analysis to redistricting. In both
instances, the Court has taken bright-line rules that are best under
stood as means to an end (a healthy multiracial society) and treated
them as ends unto themselves. In clinging to these two rules, the Court
has blinded itself to political and racial complexities that such rules are
not robust enough to address.
For Kousser, a full understanding of historical context requires us
to focus upon institutions. We should worry about the Supreme
Court's Shaw jurisprudence precisely because "institutions and institu
tional rules - not customs, ideas, attitudes, culture, or private behav
ior - have primarily shaped race relations in America" (p. 1). As
those first few lines of the book make clear, Kousser is an academic
maverick. In emphasizing the importance of law and formal institu
tions, Kousser is fighting a marked shift toward cultural and social
analysis in history departments and law schools throughout the coun
try .31 And, as with everything else in the book, Kousser never does
anything by halves. Rather than suggesting that those moving toward
cultural analysis have struck the wrong balance and placed too little
other aspects of political participation and representation. See Kathryn Abrams, Raising
Politics Up: Minority Politics and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 448,
455-56 (1988); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compact
ness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 186-87, 198 (1989).
29. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
30. Compare pp. 317-65, 494 n.2, with Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Ra
cial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2507-08, 2537-44 (1987).
31. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Critical Cultural Legal Studies, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN.
475-76 (1998); Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudica
tion in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1387-88 (1998).
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emphasis upon formal institutions and politics,32 he refuses to accept
that cultural and societal forces have any explanatory weight.
Kousser's emphasis on traditional institutional analysis leads him
into strikingly new terrain. The first chapter, for example, argues that
the conventional story about the failure of Reconstruction is incorrect
(pp. 40-49). Political battles in Washington - not racial ideology or
Southern cultural practices - were the reason Reconstruction failed.
Specifically, Kousser claims that efforts to protect the political power
of African Americans after the Civil War failed not because of social
forces that led to violence and fraud in the South, but because
nineteenth-century congressional representatives enjoyed slim elec
toral margins in their districts. The absence of safe seats led to signifi
cant turnover in Congress. As a result, the inexperienced legislators
who were elected hewed closely to the party line rather than reaching
the type of bipartisan compromises on racial issues made possible in
the 1950s and 1960s by safe seats and minimal political competition
(pp. 40-49, 53). Kousser's argument - that the "First Reconstruction
died from too much democracy" (p. 49) and that the Second thrived
precisely because congressional representatives enjoyed safe seats not only provides a counterintuitive response to the conventional wis
dom that competitive districts are an unalloyed good,33 but it also of
fers a weighty challenge to the story we now tell about Reconstruc
tion.
Chapters Two through Six offer more recent analyses of the rela
tionship between race and politics. These chapters - five case studies
that trace redistricting and electoral controversies in Los Angeles,
Memphis, Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas during the last fifty
years - are filled with intimate, ugly details about electoral politics
and read, as one commentator has noted, like a "political whodun
nit[]. "3 4
Each of these chapters also furthers Kousser's underlying agenda
- showing how Shaw's formalism ignores important historical reali
ties. For example, while Shaw rests on the assumption that a districting
body's racial motivations can readily be separated from its political
aims,35 Kousser shows that race and politics are inextricably inter
twined. By documenting the self-interested efforts of politicians to
32. For an example of this type of move, see Desan, supra note 31, at 1387-89.
33. See Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617, 622 (8th Cir. 1989); BRUCE E. CAIN, THE
REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 2 (1984); Bruce E. Cain, Perspectives on Davis v. Bandemer:
Views of the Practitioner, Theorist, and Reformer, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND
THE COURTS 117, 128 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
34. David Lublin, Race and Redistricting in the 1990s, AM. POL SCI. REV. (forthcoming
2001) (reviewing Colorblind Injustice and MARK RUSH, ED., VOTING RIGHTS AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES) .
35. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 599 U.S. 817, 905-07 (1996).
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take advantage of racial cleavages, he provides significant evidence
that "matters of racial power" as much as "unthinking racial animos
ity" have undermined minority voting rights in the recent past.36
In the chapter on Los Angeles (Chapter Two), for instance,
Kousser offers a fact-intensive, well-documented tale about rank hy
pocrisy and the cynical manipulation of race. We see that although
white politicians consistently ignored the needs of the Latino commu
nity, they never hesitated to invoke these concerns to justify their ac
tions or to manipulate Latino interests to further their own political
aims (p. 120-34). Kousser thus complicates the Supreme Court's con
ventional model of racial motive, which is largely preoccupied with
manifestations of outright racial hostility and premised on the assump
tion that race can be separated from politics.
Kousser's chapters on the redistricting battles that took place in
Texas and North Carolina during the 1990s (Chapters Five & Six)
similarly document the tangled relationship between race and politics
and cast doubt upon the simplistic approach of the Shaw cases. While
the Supreme Court confidently identified a "predominantly racial mo
tive" from the shape of the districts and scattered pieces of evidence
from the record,37 Kousser describes the astounding complexity of the
racial and political tradeoffs made to create those challenged districts.
His adept use of historical narrative provides a far richer account of
these cases than the Court's decisions and, once again, muddies the
motive-based distinction the Supreme Court has tried to draw. Ironi
cally, while Kousser seems to accept the Supreme Court's premise that
Miller's predominant factor standard serves a meaningful analytical
role in the context of redistricting,38 his detailed analysis provides as
compelling a refutation of that premise as one could hope to craft.
These chapters also highlight the significant role that institutions
and legal rules play in shaping race relations, another concern Kousser
raises about Shaw. Kousser does not simply depict racial minorities as
the passive victims of private white oppression. He shows that racial
minorities could and did resist disenfranchisement, and that whites of
ten had to modify institutional structures to achieve their aims.39 In his
chapter on Georgia, for example, Kousser describes the emergence of
fairly powerful groups of African Americans in Macon during the first
half of the twentieth century; these organizations were able to attract
36. P. 67; see also p. 9.
37. Id. at 905-07; Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 955-72 (1996).
38. See supra note 30.
39. Kousser's efforts thus fit neatly within the scholarly tradition of C. Vann Woodward,
who warned against depicting the African American as "a passive element, the man to
whom things happens . . . the object rather than the subject of history." WOODWARD,
FUTURE OF THE PAST, supra note 8, at 18-19. For more recent efforts in this vein, see, for
example, GLENDA F. GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW (1996).
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the support of white politicians and "sen[d] comparatively moderate
whites to the legislature" (p. 214). The success of these "black
slatemakers" eventually proved to be their undoing, for their effec
tiveness provided the impetus behind the state's majority-vote law (p.
214-42). Manipulation of legal rules was the only way for whites to
preserve their power.
In sum, the first half of Colorblind Injustice confirms why we
should be concerned about history in the context of voting. Voting
rights suits largely concern the distribution of political power, and
Kousser's book makes clear that power relations are far too complex
to be captured by Shaw's narrow conception of racial motive. Color
blindness seems impossible in a world where race and politics are in
separable. And the Court errs in trying to fit redistricting decisions
into the formal motive-based categories employed in other areas of
equal protection. Whatever the validity of those categories elsewhere,
they do not come close to capturing the complexities of decisions
made in the redistricting context.40 Instead, as Colorblind Injustice
demonstrates, the lens of conventional equal protection doctrine nec
essarily distorts the realities of districting and blinds the Court to its
political and racial intricacies.
II.

THE ROLE OF NORMATIVE ARGUMENT
IN EQUAL PROTECTION LAW

The second half of Colorblind Injustice contains Kousser's direct
attack on the Rehnquist Court. It offers a series of critiques of the
Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, all with a view to
showing that the Shaw decisions were rendered in bad faith. Kousser
effectively documents the significant discrepancies between Shaw and
prior equal protection doctrine (pp. 371-79, 383-99, 445-50), the inter
nal inconsistencies within the Shaw decisions (pp. 387-88, 390-91), and
the divisions among the members of the Shaw majority (pp. 399-409,
413, 448). He skillfully traces the Supreme Court's un·even course be
tween the twin shoals of intent and effect (ch. 7) and incorporates the
work of voting rights scholars into his analysis.41 One can only admire
the lawyerly manner in which Kousser demolishes many of the claims
40. P. 391; see also Pildes, supra note 30, at 2537-43.
41. One noteworthy omission in the book, however, is Kousser's failure to cite Samuel
Issacharoff's or Lani Guinier's work on Shaw and the role of groups in the democratic proc
ess. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, (E)rasing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 109 (1994); Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A
Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1589, 1591 (1993); Samuel Issacharoff,
Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 883-84 (1995); Samuel Issacharoff,
Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 210
(1995). The omission may be a deliberate one, as these articles involve precisely the type of
normative analysis Kousser wishes to eschew. See infra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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made by advocates of Shaw. He is the kind of expert witness (or law
yer) one would hate to see on the other side of the courtroom.
Nonetheless, as welcome a contribution as Colorblind Injustice is
to the Shaw debate, the second half of the book is less persuasive than
the more subtle challenge that the first half's historical scholarship
provides. This is primarily because Kousser fails to articulate or de
fend the normative premises of his critiques.
Kousser's strategy appears to be· a deliberate one. He believes that
historical facts, not normative principles, should decide equal protec
tion cases (pp. 328-31). "For the Equal Protection Clause," he writes,
"history, and only history, matters" (p. 456). Kousser defends his
choice by flipping the claim made during the debates about the role of
social science in equal protection cases that took place in the wake of
Brown v. Board of Education.42 Some opposed the Court's use of so
cial science to evaluate segregation's constitutionality (Brown's fa
mous footnote 11) out of concern that such reliance would leave equal
protection claims vulnerable to inconsistent results and subjective
judgments. 43 Kousser makes precisely the opposite argument. He
claims that if civil rights claims rest on normative principles, then
equal protection will hinge upon a judge's intuitive view of what is
"right" rather than upon historical and empirical analysis that can be
evaluated objectively (pp. 328-31). In Kousser's words, "to reimagine
Brown as resting on an unstated principle was to throw its meaning
open to a variety of contradictory claims" (p. 329), perhaps even to
allow equal protection principles to depend on "personal preferences"
(p. 331).
There are two problems with Kousser's strategy. First, as Section
II.A explains, Kousser's challenge to Shaw is necessarily replete with

42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For other contributors to this debate, see ROSEMARY J.
ERICKSON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW: How THE SUPREME COURT HAS USED
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN DECIDING THE IMPORTANT WOMEN'S ISSUES OF ABORTION AND SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1994); I. A. NEWBY, CHALLENGE TO THE COURT: SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
AND THE DEFENSE OF SEGREGATION, 1954-1966 (1967); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawful
ness of the Segregation Decision, 69 YALE L. J. 421 (1960); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30
N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955); Kenneth Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social
Scientist's Role, 5 VILL. L. REV. 224 (1960); John Coons, Recent Trends in Science Fiction:
Serrano Among the People of Number, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 23 (1977); William E. Doyle, Can
Social Science Data Be Used in Judicial Decisionmaking? 6 J.L. & EDUC. 13 (1977); Ronald
Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights - the Consequences of Uncertainty, 6
J.L & EDUC. 3 (1977); Sheri L. Gronhovd, Social Science Statistics in the Courtroom: The
Debate Resurfaces in McClesky v. Kemp, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 688 (1987); Will Maslow,
How Social Scientists Can Shape Legal Processes,. 5 VILL. L. REV. 241 (1960); Frank
McGurk, The Law, Social Science and Academic Freedom -A Psychologist's View, 5 VILL.
L. REV. 247 (1960); Ray Rist and Ronald Anson, Social Science and the Judicial Process in
Education Cases, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1977); Ernest van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in
the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REV. 69 (1961).
.

43. Cahn, supra note 42, 167-68; see also Black, supra note 42.
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normative assumptions.44 But those assumptions are not fully articu
lated, let alone defended. And because Kousser never directly ad
dresses the difficult normative questions underlying Shaw, one leaves
the book feeling that some of the strongest arguments for Shaw have
been left unanswered.
If Kousser merely seeks to downplay, but not eliminate, normative
debate in the equal protection context, there is a second reason to cri
tique Colorblind Injustice. As Section 11.B argues, equal protection
doctrine unmoored from an explicit normative theory leads to a dif
ferent variant of the rule-bound formalism Kousser decries. Moreover,
Kousser never fully explains why a robust normative debate 'is less
likely to lead to "truth" - or at least that norms are less likely to con
strain judicial discretion - than the empirical battles he prefers.
A.

The Role ofNormative Debate in Shaw

The main problem with Kousser's decision to eschew normative
debate in challenging Shaw is that we need a normative theory to
make the jump from "is" to "ought" - to deci�e what Kousser's de
scription of the past tells us about the Supreme Court's current equal
protection jurisprudence. For example, much of Colorblind Injustice is
devoted to questions about racial intent and effect. Kousser asserts
that these "are essentially empirical rather than legal questions" (pp.
5, 318); "delineations of intent" are meant "to be factual inquiries, not
roundabout ways of weighing competing interests" (p. 494 n.4). That
assumption is difficult to sustain.45 Even setting aside the problem of
reconstructing another actor's motive, any definition of cause and ef
fect will be fraught with normative questions and the "weighing [of]
competing interests," and those normative concerns will inevitably af
fect how we filter and translate historical fact into legal judgments.
Consider the differences in approach under a highly stylized tax
onomy of three basic theories of equal protection jurisprudence: (1)
the antidiscrimination principle,46 (2) a subordination theory,47 and (3)

44. Horwitz, History and Theory, supra note 10, at 1835 ("Every system of legal archi
tecture incorporates deep into that structure a set of normative premises about the proper
way to talk about law.").
45. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Auton
omy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 94-95 (2000). For
concrete examples of this type of analysis 'in constitutional law, see Jed Rubenfeld, Affirma
tive Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997) (arguing that Supreme Court's current approach
to equal protection reflects a cost-benefit analysis); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 PA. L. REV. 247 (1996) (making

similar argument in First Amendment context).
46. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1975); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 CHI. L. REV. 235,
241, 263-313 (1971) (describing and critiquing this approach); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 109, 128-77 (1976) [hereinafter Fiss,
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an expressive harms approach. 48 Assuming that we could agree upon
the "facts," we might reach different conclusions about intent and ef
fect depending on which theory we chose. Those who subscribe to the
antidiscrimination principle are likely to define intent as the subjective
"intent to harm" someone on account of race. 49 Those who adhere to
the subordination theory, in contrast, seek to prevent action that has
the effect (intentional or not) of further disadvantaging a group that
has traditionally been relegated to an inferior position in society.50
And those who subscribe to an expressive harm theory of constitu
tional wrongs will conceive of illicit intent as the social meaning con
veyed by a decision, whether or not subjectively intended. Further, the
"effect" with which they are concerned involves the social values the
state expresses when it adopts a classification. 51 For all of these rea
sons, a reasonable person might reach different conclusions about the
same set of historical facts depending on which theory of intent and
effect she employed.
We should not be surprised, then, that Kousser himself makes
normative judgments in discussing questions of intent. For instance, he
claims that "[a]ny reasonable intent standard . . . must . . . reject a re
quirement of proof of hostility" (p. 346). And, as noted above, much
of his book is devoted to explaining how equal protection jurispru
dence should take into account the fact that "matters of racial power"
as much as "unthinking racial animosity" have harmed racial minori
ties (p. 67). Thus, while Kousser seems to stop short of endorsing the
alternative rejected in Feeney52
that intent can be established when
-

Groups] (same); Peter Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimi
nation Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 568 (1998) (same).

47. See Fiss, Groups, supra note 46 (offering an early.articulation of this theory); see also
Ruth Colker, Anti-subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1003, 1007 (1986) (same); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Fore
word: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977) (de
veloping and further refining the theory); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory lntent and the
Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989) (same); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411-12 (1994) (same).
48. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive
Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 13-14, 34-35 (2000) (discussing effect
and intent in the context of expressive harms); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Ex
pressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appear
ances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are
Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL. STUD.
725 (1998); Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contracts, 29
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 63, 76-99 (1994) (arguing that intent in equal protection cases
should be modeled on the concept of objective intent employed in contract law).
49. See Fiss, Groups, supra note 46, 109-28.
50. See Colker, supra note 47, at 1007; Strauss, supra note 47.
51. See Hellman, supra note 48, at 13-14, 34-35.
52. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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decisionmakers act "in spite of" the impact of their actions on a pro
tected group - his view of intent is clearly more expansive than the
Supreme Court's view.
Such an approach, of course, itself suggests a particular normative
theory of equality. Kousser's theory retains the notion of intentional
ity but expands intent beyond the narrow confines of animus. Self
interested decisions to harm racial minorities are thus censured in the
same way as those based on raeial hostility - an interesting take on
the nature of partisanship. But the baseline for measuring equality is
not a results-based standard. Instead, Kousser seems to retain the
notion of "innocence" - that the law should not censure decision
makers who inadvertently harm racial minorities, even if their power
is exercised in, and possibly derived from, a social context permeated
by racial hierarchies. That view itself reflects heavily freighted as
sumptions about the role of race in our society.
Kousser's broader theory for critiquing Shaw is similarly norma
tive. His criticisms of Shaw suggest that he subscribes to Katzenbach's
one-way ratchet approach53 - if a policy promotes the interests of ra
cial minorities, we should adopt it. Shaw is wrong, in Kousser's view,
because it harms the interests of racial minorities and consistently
reaches results that undermine their political power. 5 4
One could certainly develop a coherent defense of this normative
approach by drawing upon the history Kousser documents in the first
chapters of the book.55 One could also defend this approach against
countervailing normative concerns.56 Unfortunately, Kousser does nei
ther.
For example, Kousser never specifies how we should define the
"interests" of racial minorities. The definition of minority interests,
however, is fraught with complex normative judgments. For instance,
in attacking Shaw for having an adverse effect on racial minorities,
Kousser makes interesting pronouncements about what types of dis·
53. The one-way ratchet theory of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amend
ment was first articulated in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
54. E.g., pp. 366-467.
55. In addition to providing ample evidence to suggest that remedial efforts to aid racial
minorities are still necessary, Kousser has shown that race and politics are so intertwined as
to be inseparable. This evidence could justify what amounts to a res ipsa /oquitur approach
to voting rights: because racial animus is so deeply embedded in political decisions, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we can assume that any decision that harms racial mi
norities was undertaken for an invidious purpose. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Min
uet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2255 (1996) (sketching out this
theory in the employment discrimination context and, ultimately, rejecting it).
56. For example, Kousser might concede the problem of essentialism but maintain that
its costs are outweighed by the harms that would result in the absence of race-conscious
remedies. See Frank I. Michelman, Super/iberal Romance, Community, and Tradition in
William J. Brennan Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1290-1326 (1991) (of
fering this type of defense in the context of affirmative action).
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tricts provide the best alternative for racial minorities (pp. 432-34, 462
& n.3) - that is, how we should resolve the well-known trade-off be
tween "descriptive representation" (the number of candidates elected
to office who are racial minorities) and "substantive representation"
(the likelihood that policies favored by the minority community will
be passed, even if they are passed by whites that minority voters have
helped elect).57 Kousser does not offer a normative explanation as to
why we should prefer one approach over the other. Instead, he asserts
that "[q]uestions about who best represents minorities and whether
they are better off with concentrated or dispersed influence are em
pirical, not . . . theoretical" (p. 462). He thus fails to respond to some
of the normative questions that come to mind when considering this
trade-off: Who should decide this question? Judges? The affected
community? The legislature? Even if courts must answer the question,
what theory of representation should guide that choice? How should
courts assess where the process of democratic compromise will take
place - at the district level, when voters elect their representatives, or
at the legislative level, among representatives? Is the notion of de
scriptive representation reconcilable with traditional liberal practices
that we think are worth maintaining?58
A second, related problem with Kousser's unwillingness to engage
in normative debate is that he and the Shaw Court end up talking past
one another. Kousser spends a great deal of time attacking the theory
of colorblindness on the ground that its implementation will harm the
interests of racial minorities. Nonetheless, although he criticizes a doc
trine plainly grounded in fears of essentialism, Kousser never con
vincingly addresses this normative concern. Instead, he asserts that
empirical facts tell us everything we need to know. He writes that the
Supreme Court should not worry about the use of "race as a proxy" in
redistricting because race works as a proxy only if "political behavior
[is] truly strongly correlated with race," and "not if it were an irra
tional or demeaning stereotype. "59 But one might well be concerned
about the use of racial or gender classifications on normative grounds
even when they provide a fairly good proxy for the characteristics or
behavior of group members.60
57. See Karlan, supra note 28, at 213-14; Pildes, supra note 30, at 2530-31 & n.99, 2544
n.133. Kousser himself has wrestled with this question and concluded that influence districts
represent a viable means of minority representation. See Kousser, supra note 16, at 551.
58. See MELISSA WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY (1998) (exploring some of
these normative questions); James U. Blacksher, American Political Identity and History, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 715, 717 (2001) (raising some of these questions in reviewing ALEXANDER
KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES (2000)).
59. P. 416; see also p. 489 n.18.
60. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 46, at 573; David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness,
1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 112-14 (1986); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11
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Moreover, a sustained normative discussion of equal protection
would reveal that colorblindness is too easy a target. One can surely
dismiss the notion that colorblindness should be our legal ideal and
still be worried about race-conscious redistricting. The difficulty for
Shaw opponents is not persuading those in the middle of this debate
that race-conscious districting is sometimes an acceptable means of en
forcing the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, the hard part is articu
lating the limits to that principle. How far should we go to augment
minority electoral strength? Should we abandon territorially based
districting for those groups unable to aggregate their votes effectively?
Is our goal integrationist - fostering interracial coalitions - or
empowerment and independence for minority communities? Is race
conscious districting consistent with the tenets of liberalism, or does it
lead us to the problem of essentialism by requiring us to make as
sumptions about individuals based on their group membership? And if
we think race-conscious districting inevitably leads to essentialization,
how do we evaluate the costs and benefits of such actions?
I should note that my call for a normative defense does not stem
from a dislike of Kousser's policy recommendations. Like Kousser, I
am not ready to abandon territorial-based districting entirely. But I
suspect we get there in quite different ways. To put it in extraordinar
ily abbreviated terms, in my view the debate over territorial-based dis
tricting involves a choice about where we want the bulk of democratic
compromise to take place: at the ballot box or on the legislative floor.
In many situations, compromise is likely to be easier at the legislative
level, and in some instances that in itself may favor - even mandate
- adoption of a non-geographic/interest-based form of allocating po
litical power, such as cumulative voting. But, speaking in unforgivably
broad generalities, the risk involved in a cumulative voting scheme is
that too much of the democratic compromise necessary to pass legisla
tion will take place solely at the legislative level. A cumulative voting
scheme allows voters to disperse into small, interest-based groups and
elect candidates that closely mirror their own preferences. The result
tends to be a more diverse set of legislators. At some point, however, a
move to the middle will be necessary to pass legislation - preferences
must be ranked, compromises made, trade-offs accepted. Under a cu
mulative voting scheme, many of the judgments involved in this move
to the middle will be made directly by the legislators themselves, not
the voters.61
(1994); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201 (1976). Indeed, Mary Anne Case has identified im
perfect proxies as the essence of the Court's current equal protection jurisprudence. See
Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condems": Constitutional Sex Discrimina
tion Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (2000).
61. This concern would be far weaker, however, if we could develop a more dynamic
relationship between representative and constituent. Concerns about voters' passivity and
lack of involvement in legislative compromise might not be relevant if legislators and their
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In a territorial-based scheme, by contrast, voters are usually
clumped together with people who do not share their interests. They
cannot align along a narrowly defined set of interests but must instead
find a candidate who can reach out to many different groups and in
terests. In effect, voters themselves must make at least an initial step
toward the middle if they hope to have any effect on legislative out
comes. And if one believes, as I do, that voting involves constitutive
and expressive elements,62 there is certainly something to be said for
allowing "the people" to be directly involved in this type of demo
cratic compromise. Indeed, presumably the reason that most of us find
consociational democracy so unpalatable is that sometimes we would
rather force people with different interests to find a consensus candi
date and platform rather than allow them to stand on the sidelines as
their chosen representatives forge those compromises. In short, the
compromise that takes place on election day in a territorial-based
scheme ensures that voters make at least some of the judgments in
volved in the inevitable move to the middle.
Because territorial-based districting takes place in such varied con
texts, it also offers us a laboratory to engage in democratic experimen
tation. It provides an opportunity to discover which districting
schemes best facilitate compromises on all sides, particularly by those
who have traditionally enjoyed a disproportionate share of political
power. Indeed, at least one recent empirical study suggests that the
creation of majority-minority districts has led to new interracial coali
tions and a decrease in racially polarized voting in the South.63
Where voting is racially polarized, however, drawing districts that
foster democratic compromise among different racial groups requires
a firm understanding of the context in which those compromises take
place. For example, the supposed trade-off between "independence"
and "integration" - between political control and political influence6 4

constituents were true democratic partners. For an effort to achieve this goal, see LANI
GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY (forthcoming 2002).
62. See Ellen Katz, Race and The Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 491, 512-14 (2000); Frank Michelman, Conceptions ofDemocracy in American Consti
tutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 478-79 (1989).
63. See generally DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION
(1999). I do not mean to suggest here that cumulative voting schemes always prevent this
type of healthy democratic activities. To the contrary, one of the strongest reasons to con
sider a cumulative voting system is early evidence that such systems similarly foster cross
racial coalitions. See Richard H. Pildes and Kristen A. Donahue, Cumulative Voting in the
United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241 (1995).
64. In the political science literature, this debate is cast in terms of descriptive and sub
stantive representation. Political scientists debate whether racial minorities benefit more
from majority-minority districts, where they can elect candidates of their own race if they
choose to do so, or from "influence districts," which allow them to elect a larger number of
white legislators who will promote their substantive preferences. See supra text accompany
ing note 57.
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- may be a false one. Those who insist that our aspiration should be
political integration may discover that granting racial minorities politi
cal independence is a necessary precondition for achieving that goal.65
On this view, the interracial coalitions we see emerging in the South
could not have occurred without giving African-American voters a
measure of political independence. Put another way, meaningful
democratic compromise may require coequals; compromise and coali
tions that stem from necessity rather than choice do little to promote
democratic values.
I also agree with Kousser that race-conscious districting ought to
be allowed in certain circumstances. We must come to grips with the
fact that territorial-based districting cannot achieve any of these
democratic aspirations without race-conscious districting, thus forcing
us to deal squarely with the costs of essentialization. I am ready to ac
cept those costs when they are weighed against the benefits of
majority-minority districts and the costs of the alternative, race
blinding districting. In any case, all of these questions involve difficult
and compelling debates, and it would have been well worth Kousser's
time to address them.
Finally, even when viewed from a purely instrumental perspective,
Kousser's reluctance to engage in explicit normative debate is puz
zling. Normative theory and historical context are often so intertwined
as to be inseparable, especially when we are discussing race.66 Because
"debates cast in empirical terms often masquerade for deeper, under
lying disagreements about cultural assumptions and normative ideals,"
I suspect that the empirical battle Kousser wishes to wage cannot be
won without a normative fight.67
It is not only that normative theory is our framework for deciding
what "is" - the means by which we assess the empirical facts before
us. Normative theory is inherently forward-looking; it tells us which
facts ought to matter going forward. An adherent to the principle of
colorblindness, for example, might willingly concede the existence of
racism in the past and present. But she is looking toward a future of
colorblindness, and she might think that the bright promise of that fu
ture requires the law - the textual embodiment of our future aspira
tions - to ignore these realities. For these reasons, even if one could
persuade advocates of Shaw that Kousser has gotten the facts "right,"
many would remain convinced of Shaw's correctness because of the
65. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1075-76 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the independence accorded to ethnic minorities was a necessary precondition to their integration into the political system).
·

66. See ERICKSON, supra note 42; Horwitz, History and Theory, supra note 10, at 182526.
67. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 704-05 (2001);
see also Coons, supra note 42, at 25; Horwitz, History and Theory, supra note 10, at 1827.
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normative principles they hold. If Kousser seeks converts to his cause,
he needs a different sermon.
B.

Normative Theory Provides a Necessary Anchor for Good
Judging

If, as seems more likely, Kousser is merely trying to downplay, not
eliminate, the role of normative debate in equal protection, there is
another reason to criticize his approach. The failure to engage in nor
mative debate will result in a different variant of the formalism
Kousser criticizes in Shaw. If legal rules are not firmly anchored to a
normative theory, at some point they can cease functioning as means
to an end and become ends unto themselves. The normative principles
embedded in those rules will thus be lost, and the rules will be applied
even in contexts where those normative principles would counsel a dif
ferent result. As with Shaw, the rule will be all that matters.
Consider the development of the one-person, one-vote cases.
These cases were originally fashioned as equal protection claims based
on the assumption that rural voters had different interests than urban
voters.68 And the Court's early articulation of the one-person, one
vote principle might have eventually developed into a sufficiently ro
bust theory of democracy to take that truth into account.69
But that was not the path the Court took. Eventually, the Court
simply stopped talking about which voters were affected by the
skewed districting system or trying to develop a theory of democratic
governance to explain why judicial action was required. Unsurpris
ingly, the injury in these cases became quite abstract and was eventu
ally defined in highly formal terms. In the absence of a normative
theory justifying the Court's intervention into the democratic process,
it was difficult to identify an appropriate limiting principle. The ab
stract right to equality inevitably became an end unto itself, rather
than a means to an end.70 Thus, in the one-person, one-vote cases, pre
cise numeric equality became the standard for equal protection with-

68. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 273 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting the
complaint as challenging discrimination against a "geographical class of persons").
69. Compare Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (describing one-person, one
vote principle as fostering equal representation), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 &
n.40, 565-66 (1964) (asserting that the Constitution mandated the "full and effective partici
pation" of citizens within the democratic process, guaranteed "fair and effective representa
tion" to them, and forbade efforts to undermine citizens' voting power "by any method or
means . . . no matter what their form"), with Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (defin
ing one-person, one-vote principle in circular terms as implicating the right to an equally
weighted vote).
70. As Morton Horwitz has pointed out, when "abstract legal concepts, instead of real
ity" drive a jurisprudence, "technical distinctions . . . have a logic of their own." Horwitz,
Constitution of Change, supra note 10, at 109.
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out any coherent theory for why a well-functioning democracy de
manded such a result.
If one seeks other examples of the problems inherent in an equal
protection jurisprudence that is not anchored to a normative theory,
one need look no further than the Supreme Court's two most recent
voting decisions: Bush v. Gore71 and Hunt v. Cromartie.72 Bush v. Gore
offers a good example of the problems inherent in privileging facts
over normative analysis. It was undisputed in that case that ballots
were being evaluated under different standards; the Court's entire de
cision hinges on that fact.73 But the Court never offered a normative
theory explaining why this type of inequality should matter or recon
ciling that view with well-established equal protection norms. Should
the courts continue to develop this line of decisions, one can easily
imagine the Bush v. Gore line following the same path as the one
person, one-vote cases. In the absence of a theory for justifying or
limiting judicial intervention, equality among counting mechanisms
will become an end unto itself, and we will never have normative ex
planation for why (and when) the Fourteenth Amendment demands
judicial intervention. It is hard to see why such a barren approach is
superior to the formalism Kousser decries in Shaw.
Interestingly, the same problem afflicts the Supreme Court's most
recent Shaw decision: Hunt v. Cromartie.74 Hunt is one of the rare
Shaw cases reaching the result Kousser seeks - it upholds the consti
tutionality of a majority-minority district on purely factual grounds.
But both Justice Breyer's majority decision and Justice Thomas's dis
sent are strikingly formal and mechanical. Each takes an agreed-upon
set of facts, applies the same standard, and reaches dramatically dif
ferent conclusions. Even someone who approves of the result will find
the decision unsatisfying. Because both opinions play down the nor
mative underpinnings of Shaw in precisely the manner Kousser seems
to endorse, they are bereft of any sense of the broader issues at stake.
This is the jurisprudence of the technocrat: mechanical, seemingly
neutral adjudication that conceals, but does not eliminate, the norma
tive significance of the decision.
C.

The Quest for Normative "Truths"

A second problem with Kousser's heavy reliance on empirical facts
over normative debate is that he never explains why a battle of his
torical experts is any more likely to lead us to "truth" than a robust
71. 531 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 525 (2000).
72. 121 S. Ct. 1 452 (2001).
73. Bush, 121 S.Ct. at 530-31.
74. Hunt, 121 S. Ct. 1452.
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normative debate.75 Kousser's heavy emphasis on empirics seems to
stem from his views on the objectivity wars that have raged in schol
arly circles.76 Kousser explicitly rejects the notion that "truth" cannot
be discovered through rigorous analysis and debates about empirical
facts (pp. 364-65). Kousser thus rejects the uneasy truce over objectiv
ity that has been negotiated in history departments and law schools
throughout the country - the widespread acceptance of certain post
modern critiques by scholars who nonetheless "stop analytically short
of the radical implications of an antipositivist, postmodernist intellec
tual culture. "77
75. It is certainly plausible that explorations of historical fact are subject to good-faith
mistakes as well as bad-faith manipulation. Morton Horwitz has described the process by
which judges unintentionally "lose touch with social reality" by adopting categorizations and
classifications that "either privileg[e] or screen[] out various facts." See Horwitz, Constitution
of Change, supra note 10, at 92. Kousser, for example, argues that the disadvantages caused
by antimiscegenation laws and Jim Crow were "too obvious to need social scientific exami
nation." P. 331. The Shaw majority appears to think the same is true of its own factual intui
tions about the effects of racial gerrymandering, and it has thus announced a new constitu
tional harm without the benefit of any empirical evidence supporting its claims. See Pamela
S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1211 (1996).
Nor can we simply avoid such disagreements by demanding that academics engage in re
search. For example, "in the early decades of the twentieth century, the most professionally
accomplished work on Reconstruction - work hailed by the profession as the most objec
tive, the most balanced, the most fair - was viciously racist." PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE
DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 14
(1998); see also LEE D. BAKER, FROM SAVAGE TO NEGRO: ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF RACE, 1896-1954, 5 (1998) (arguing that the initial success of anthro
pology as a profession hinged on the fact that "early ethnologists provided scientific support
for widely held ideas about the racial inferiority of people of color"). Similarly, after the
Warren Court invoked social science data to support its decision in Brown, supra notes 4243, numerous social scientists sought to prove the dangers of desegregation and the inevita
bility of racial inequality. See NEWBY, supra note 42, at 191-94.
76. P. 8. Debates about objectivity have reverberated in halls of history departments
throughout the country. E. g., Kousser, supra note 4. For description and analysis of contro
versies regarding objectivity among historians, see, for example, APPLEBY ET AL., supra note
9; NOVICK, supra note 75; Appleby, supra note 9, at 6-9. For a closely related debate about
whether historians should serve as expert witnesses, including analyses of the controversy
surrounding the historians' amicus brief in a Supreme Court abortion case, see NOVICK, su
pra note 75, at 469-521; Michael D. Bess, E.P. Thompson: The Historian as Activist, 98 AM.
HIST. REV. 19 (1993); Estelle B. Freedman, Historical Interpretation and Legal Advocacy:
Rethinking the Webster Amicus Brief, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 27; Thomas
Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the
Sears Case, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1629 (1988); Kousser, supra note 4; Jane E. Larson & Clyde
Spillenger, "That's Not History": The Boundaries of Advocacy and Scholarship, 12 PUB.
HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 33; William E. Leuchtenburg, The Historian and the Public
Realm, 97 AM. HIST. REV. 1 (1992); Peyton McCrary & J. Gerald Hebert, Keeping the
Courts Honest: The Role of Historians as Expert Witnesses in Southern Voting Rights Cases,

16 SOUTHERN U. L. REV. 102 (1989); James C. Mohr, Historically Based Legal Briefs: Ob
servations of a Participant in the Webster Process, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at 19;
Ronald C. Tobey, The Public Historian as Advocate: Is Special Attention to Professional
Ethics Necessary?, PUB. HISTORIAN, Winter 1986, at 21.
77. William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Modera
tion as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 784-85 (1991) (describing the
"New Public Law scholars"); see also APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 9, at 247 (describing "a
different, more nuanced, less absolutist kind of realism than that championed by an older -
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It is odd that Kousser takes such a strong position in favor of ob
jectivity given that his scholarship traces the path not taken.78 After all,
presumably the main reason to privilege facts over normative theory is
the assumption that empirical research involves a "right" answer. But
Kousser's scholarship seeks to uncover the causal chains that were
broken, the opportunities that were squandered, in order to persuade
us that the history we know was not foreordained. Thus, while his
scholarship is rigorously empirical, it also requires the imaginative
power to discern what might have been - something that does not
lend itself easily to a label like "right" or "wrong."79
It is equally odd that Kousser so easily accepts the notion that
normative debate is inherently subjective while dismissing out of hand
challenges to the objectivity of historical scholarship. After all, both
are grounded in the same type of concerns. Assuming that it is possi
ble to separate empirical debates from their normative underpin
nings,80 if Kousser is confident that historical and empirical evidence
can demonstrate that the Shaw majority was wrong and the Warren
Court was right on the facts, why can't we be just as confident (or at
least hopeful) that serious debate will help us distinguish "good" nor
mative theories from "bad" ones?81 Similarly, those who subscribe to
the uneasy compromise over objectivity adopted by historians and le
gal scholars alike82 may wonder why normative arguments cannot be
subjected to "pragmatic truth-testing"83 in the same way we test his-

we would say naive - realism"); id. at 254 ("conced[ing] the impossibility of any research
being neutral" while believing in "the viability of stable bodies of knowledge that can be
communicated, built upon, and subjected to testing"); NOVICK, supra note 75, at 2 (noting
that "there is less talk" among historians "of approaching the past 'without preconcep
tions' " and "a tendency to think of the collective voyage toward the truth as involving tack
ing, rather than sailing in a straight line toward that final destination"). The compromise
adopted in both disciplines resembles a metaphor Martha Minow shared with me: "none of
us can precisely identify where 'East' is, but we all think we can move in that direction."
78. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
79. I am indebted to Richard Parker for raising this point.
80. But see text accompanying notes 66-67.
81. One might argue that historical analysis is more likely to get us to "truth" because
everyone is able to take part in the debate. Ronald Dworkin makes a version of this argu

ment in distinguishing historical analysis from what he terms "causal social science": histori
cal judgments provide "refuge from the arbitrary" because "they must be framed in the criti
cal vocabulary of the community in question." Dworkin, supra note 42, at 6. Significantly,
however, Dworkin argues that such "interpretive science" is little different from traditional
normative debate in law, id., which similarly allows all members of the community to take
part.
82. Supra text accompanying note 77.
83. See Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 390
(1991).
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torical claims." 84 At a minimum, as long as judges have absorbed the
view that norms matter, why can't normative constraints just as effec
tively cabin their discretion as an attentiveness to historical facts?
III. THE LANGUAGE OF ADVOCACY
A review of Colorblind Injustice would not be complete without
discussing the rhetoric Kousser employs in making his case. While in
sisting that objectivity is possible (p. 8), Kousser abandons the formal
trappings of objective scholarship - the neutral tone, the dispassion
ate critique, and the effort to ensure that criticism seem even-handed.
For instance, Kousser describes the Shaw majority with language that
is as vehement as that he reserves for the authors of D red Scott and
Plessy and the architects of Jim Crow, accusing them of creating "po
litically and racially biased exceptions" to their own doctrine (p. 7),
engaged in "partisan radicalism" (p. 426), and writing "radical opin
ion[s]" (p. 369). He also harshly describes academics who support
Shaw. Indeed, at one point he characterizes their arguments as:
reminiscent of the excuse offered by Los Angeles police chief Darryl
Gates for the deaths of African-Americans at the hands of police officers
who used choke-holds: "We may be finding that in some blacks when a
[carotid restraint] is applied, the veins or arteries do not open as fast as
they do in normal people."85

Because my concern with Kousser's language is largely instrumen
tal, let me touch upon aesthetic and aspirational concerns first. Per
haps Kousser, like a revolutionary, has "no taste for irony,"86 and his
earnest and straightforward prose is simply not to my taste.87 Indeed,
on a purely aesthetic level, Kousser's attempts at advocacy interrupt
the flow of his argument and needlessly distract the reader. In his for
midable chapter on electoral politics in Memphis, for example,
Kousser explains how devices designed to preserve the power of the
white majority also "rewarded intransigence and a concentration on
rallying one's segregated tribe" and exacerbated racial divisions and
stereotypes (p. 195). At the end of this compelling and well-told narra
tive, Kousser adds the following: "unlike the parallel assertions of
84. For much more detailed defenses of this proposition, see Frank Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97

YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).

85. P. 514 n.92 (quoting Probe of Statements by Gates, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 11,
1982, § 1 , at 1).
86. WOODWARD, FuTURE OF THE PAST, supra note 8, at 49 (quoting Joseph Conrad).
Of course, according to Conrad, women and revolutionaries share similar tastes, id., so it is
not clear why Kousser's style fails to sway me. For a lovely defense of the role of irony in
scholarly analysis, see Woodward, Thinking Back, supra note 8, at 137.
87. In this sense, I share Woodward's preference for "the Shakespearean ideal of genial
adversaries." WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 236.
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Justice O'Connor in Shaw v. Reno about the deleterious consequences
of race-based districting, these conclusions . . . are based on a close
analysis of actual evidence" (p. 1 95 ).88
This passing swipe at Justice O'Connor and similar attacks scat
tered throughout the book remind one of Virginia Woolf's complaint
about Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre. Woolf quotes one notable pas
sage in the book, where the narrator describes herself sitting on the
roof of Rochester's mansion and reflecting on the restlessness of tal
ented women who are imprisoned within the narrow confines of the
roles their gender has assigned to them. Bronte follows this reverie on
the station of women in nineteenth-century England with a terribly
awkward transition: "When thus alone I not unfrequently heard Grace
Poole's laugh."89 Woolf remarks that "it is upsetting to come upon
Grace Poole all of a sudden"90 and notes:
One might say . . . laying the book down besides Pride and Prejudice, that
the woman who wrote those page had more genius in her than Jane Aus
ten: but if one reads them over and marks that jerk in them, that indigna
tion, one sees that she will never get her genius expressed whole and en

tire. She will write in a rage where she should write calmly . . . . She will
write of herself where she should write of her characters.91

The same could be said of Kousser's prose.
One might respond in Kousser's - and Charlotte Bronte's - de
fense that it is their passion that makes them great. Surely one could
quarrel with Woolf's efforts to force nineteenth-century women
authors - who have much to be angry about - to use the neutral
tone of what was, until then, a male-dominated discourse. Similarly,
one could sensibly conclude that the quiet halls of the Supreme Court
might benefit from a little more righteous indignation and a little less
hushed, lawyerly debate.
As an aspirational matter, I am ready to concede that debate need
not be carried out in a neutral, respectful way - while it is quite likely
that we will generally have a better and more productive debate with
out people shouting at each other, shouting serves a purpose on some
occasions.92 And if there is any place for strong rhetoric, it is in con88. Similarly, the very first footnote of the book's first chapter opens with a salvo
against "the racialization of the crimes and welfare issues, the political assaults on legal and
illegal immigrants, the California and congressional pushes for totally dismantling affirma
tive action, and the middle-brow tracts of Hernstein and Murray (1994), D'Souza (1995), and
Roberts and Stratton (1995)." P. 470 n.l. Even one who believes these are all worthy targets
for criticism might be a bit startled to discover this attack so early in Kousser's book.
89. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 69 (1929) (quoting Jane Eyre).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g. , Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[W]ords are often chosen as
much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Consti
tution . . . has little or no regard for that emotive function which practically speaking, may
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demning those who we believe have denied racial minorities a fair
chance to participate in the political process. Moreover, I would not
suggest that Kousser's efforts at advocacy undermine his scholarship.93
I also recognize that a preference for a deliberative tone necessar
ily implicates the debates about objectivity discussed in Part Il.9 4 Our
choice of tone, like our choice of message, may reinforce false assump
tions about objectivity and reify the hierarchies that undergird them.95
But those costs must be balanced against the effect that a consistent
use of Kousser's rhetoric may have upon judges. While the private
rant is an essential part of being human, public rants convey a certain
message about judges and their (in)capacity to set aside their own
prejudices. The real question is, if we speak to judges as if they are
their better selves, is it more likely that they will act as such? If the an
swer to that question is "yes," then there are long-term costs to
Kousser's rhetoric. I am not ready to say we should not yell on occa
sion to shake judges out of their complacency.96 And surely if we need
to designate an occasional yeller, Kousser would be a good pick. But
the unrelenting use of this type of rhetoric is a game not worth the
candle.
In any case, even taking all of these concerns into account, one can
still criticize Kousser on instrumental grounds. If Kousser wants to be
an advocate, he should try to be an effective one. Kousser makes two
mistakes in this regard. First, he ignores the cultural traditions of the
audience he is trying to reach. Second, Kousser's language sometimes
leads him to overstate his claims and thus, in the long run, undermines
his effectiveness.
often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.");
see also JAMES CARVILLE, WE'RE RIGHT, THEY'RE WRONG (1996) (offering a fine example
of the power of the rant).
93. To the contrary, Kousser's role as an advocate may have sparked his best, most crea
tive scholarship. As one commentator noted of C. Vann Woodward's work, it was his "desire
to provide southerners with a more hopeful, diverse, and discontinuous 'usable past' " that
was "critical to opening a whole new field for study and infusing it with a startling perspec
tive." Howard N. Rabinowitz, More Than the Woodward Thesis: Assessing the Strange Ca
reer of Jim Crow, 75 J. AM. HIST. 842, 849 (1988). Rabinowitz's assessment is certainly true
of Woodward's most famous book, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, which stemmed from
work he had done to support the attorneys litigating Brown v. Board of Education. NOVICK,
supra note 75, at 507; Woodward, Thinking Back, supra note 8, at 94. Interestingly,
Woodward himself seemed to be less sanguine about this question. While acknowledging
that a "dedication to noble causes . . . inspire(s] many works of history and sometimes whole
careers," he expressed concern that "the integrity of the art over which Clio presides can be
threatened by the just as well as the unjust, the righteous as well as the unrighteous." C.
Vann Woodward, Strange Career Critics: Long May They Persevere, 75 J. AM. HIST. 857, 867
(1988).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
95. See Lynn M. Sanders, A gainst Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347 (1997).
96. I am indebted to Carol Steiker, Elena Kagan, and Martha Field for helping me clar
ify my thoughts during a spirited discussion on whether the Supreme Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore presents us with just such an occasion.
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One problem with Kousser's rhetoric is that he uses the type of
language one would employ at a political rally to address a contest
being played out on the Supreme Court's turf. What Kousser fails to
grasp is that the trick to battles waged there is to distance oneself from
one's role as advocate. To the lawyers; judges, and legal academics
Kousser addresses, overblown rhetoric is generally the sign of an ad
vocate with a weak case, and interdisciplinary work like Colorblind
Injustice is likely to be most successful when it takes into account the
professional norms of the community it is addressing.
If the language of neutrality is important for lawyers, it is at least
as important for academics who wish to influence public debate. From
a purely instrumental point of view, if academics have what econo
mists would call a comparative advantage, it is that people (rightly or
wrongly) turn to us for neutral, dispassionate assessments.97 Ironically,
our apparent removal from the world gives us power in it. Whether or
not Kousser is any less "objective" than other scholars, he loses the
appearance of being so.98 And to paraphrase an overused phrase in
Shaw, advocacy is one area in which appearances do matter.99
Kousser's rhetoric seems especially unlikely to move his real audi
ence - the Shaw majority. While few believe judges are capable of
overcoming all of their biases and predispositions, most assume that
they have at least absorbed the norm of neutrality and believe them
selves to be capable of objective judgments.100 Charges of partisan bias
are unlikely to impress a judge deeply steeped in the traditions of the
legal culture and firmly persuaded of her own objectivity. Again, from
an instrumental perspective, a reasoned legal argument that shows
that a judge is making herself vulnerable to such accusations by
adopting seemingly inconsistent or unreasoned opinions is much more
likely to give her pause.101 In short, if history "must be a personal pos
session to do its work,"102 then Kousser's rhetoric is likely self
defeating.
97. See Mohr, supra note 76, at 23-25. Whether the world should look to academics for
dispassionate opinions is another question, one that is sure to be debated in the wake of the
Bush v. Gore controversy. See Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 679 (2001).
98. See Larson & Spillenger, supra note 76, at 33, 41.
99. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) ("We believe that reapportionment is one
area in which appearances do matter.").
100. For a summary of psychological studies documenting the ability of people to proc
ess identical information in divergent, self-interested ways, see Michael C. Dorf & Samuel
Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall
2001).
101. I am grateful to Pam Karlan for articulating this point in a recent discussion. For a
similar proposal, see id. (concluding that "sympathetic criticism" - by which the authors
mean "criticisms that takes seriously the enterprises in which the Court is engaged" - is
most likely to affect judicial decisionmaking).
102. Appleby, supra note 9, at 1-2.
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From an instrumental point of view, Kousser's rhetoric suffers
from a second, more serious flaw: it leads him to overstate his case and
thus undermines his credibility. Kousser uses the same type of rhetoric
in describing the Shaw majority's venial sins as he does in cataloging
its cardinal ones. And because he provides no linguistic clues to guide
his reader, the arguments he makes about Shaw's most serious flaws
get lost in his pettifogging about the Rehnquist Court and its academic
supporters.
It is difficult to convey the overall tone of Colorblind Injustice, so I
will offer just a handful of examples. Kousser rebukes Justice Kennedy
for a "misleading" citation to Bakke simply because Justice Kennedy
does not endorse Kousser's unusual (albeit more sophisticated) view
of voting claims.103 The author attacks Justice O'Connor's good faith
because she adheres to a more common (if more rudimentary) view of
compactness than he prefers.104 Kousser repeatedly censures the
Rehnquist Court for failing to overturn a Burger Court decision, Beer
v. United States,105 because he is convinced that the legislative history
of section 5 requires a different result (p. 444). While I think that
Kousser is correct about the proper reading of section S's legislative
history, it seems unduly harsh to rebuke one Justice for relying on
Beer as a sign of her "preference for extraneous materials rather than
the text of the law" (p. 444) given the Court's strongly held internal
norm of stare decisis.106 Similarly, Kousser rebukes the Court for a de
cision to grant, vacate and remand ("GVR") Quilter v. Voinovich after
103. Specifically, Kousser rebukes Justice Kennedy for "misleadingly" quoting "lan
guage from Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke in which Powell stated that 'racial and ethnic
distinctions of any kind are inherently suspect.' " P. 402. Kennedy's reliance on Bakke is
"misleading," argues Kousser, "because the Bakke case had involved a challenge to dis
crimination against white applicants to the University of California at Davis Medical School,
not just to distinctions between students." Id. While I am sympathetic to Kousser's claim
that, absent vote dilution, redistricting does not generally burden or benefit individuals in
the same way that racial classifications might in the context of employment or government
contracts, it is quite a stretch to assume that this theory is so well-entrenched in equal pro
tection doctrine that any Justice who adopts a different view of Bakke is "misleading" us.
104. Kousser rebukes her for terming "the principal Republican alternative to the sec
ond black-majority district 'reasonably compact,' even though it was thirty miles longer and
much more difficult to traverse than the district actually adopted by the North Carolina leg
islature." P. 385. Kousser concludes from this fact that Justice O'Connor "meant a district's
ugliness to remain entirely in the eye of whatever judge beheld it." Id. Perhaps. But one
might also conclude that Justice O'Connor made the same type of assumption that many of
us who are not political scientists make about compactness - that compactness is something
that can be assessed by looking at it rather than something that should be measured in func
tional terms. See Cain, supra note 33, at 77.
105. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). Beer announced that section S's "effects" test prohibits only
retrogression. Id. at 141
106. There was significant debate among the Justices in Reno v. Bossier Parish School
Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000), about whether Beer should be overturned. But even the dis
senting Justices, who thought Beer was flatly incorrect and dissented from the Court's deci
sion to extend it, were nonetheless unwilling to overturn Beer itself. See id. at 363 (Souter, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg, JJ.).
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the Court issued its opinions in Shaw v. Hunt and Bush v. Vera (pp.
370, 430, 446) even though "no fault" GVRs are reasonably common
in Supreme Court practice.107
The flaw in Colorblind Injustice is not simply that Kousser treats
petty misdemeanors by the Shaw majority as if they were high crimes.
Kousser's rhetoric is too strong for one of his primary arguments as
well. One of his main theses is that the outcomes in the Shaw cases can
be explained on purely partisan grounds - and by "partisan," Kousser
refers not to judicial ideology, but to a deliberate effort to favor the
Republican Party over the Democratic Party.108 The claim is an ex
traordinarily provocative one, and a long-term pattern of the type of
reversals and affirmances Kousser identifies would certainly raise eye
brows if no other explanations existed for the Court's decisions. But
even in the wake of Bush v. Gore,109 the evidence on which Kousser
relies is too thin to justify such a powerful accusation.
To begin, Kousser is working with a fairly small data set - just five
cases - at an early, formative stage of the Shaw doctrine. Even setting
aside the strong possibility that this data set might be skewed toward
the invalidation of plans drawn by Democrats,110 it seems too early to
107. The Supreme Court routinely grants, vacates, and remands after it issues any major
decision related to the lower court opinion being reviewed. It does so to allow the lower
court to apply the newly announced standard in the first instance. See Stutson v. United
States, 516 U.S. 163, 164 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Thomas v. Am. Home Prods., 519
U.S. 913, 914 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S.
154, 161 (1944) (describing the GVR as "[a] customary procedure").
108. See, e.g., pp. 438-39, 430, 437, 446.
109. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See Law Professors Denounce Supreme Court Ruling, at
http://www.the-rule-of-law.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2001) (listing 673 law professors con
demning the majority of Bush v. Gore for acting as "political proponents of candidate Bush,
not as judges"). For a response to the law professors' statement, see Dorf & Issacharoff, su
pra note 100.
110. First, the Shaw litigators, not the Supreme Court, have controlled which cases have
been litigated. It would not be surprising if these conservative lawyers chose to pursue their
colorblindness agenda by attacking mostly plans that favor Democrats. Second, to the extent
that Shaw hinges on the shape of a district, Democrat-drawn plans are more vulnerable to
Shaw challenges because Democrats generally have a greater incentive to create bizarrely
shaped districts than Republicans. See Pildes, supra note 14, at 1387-90. Districting inevitably
involves balancing lots of factors - compactness; the requirements of one person, one vote;
incumbency protection; partisan aims; compliance with the Voting Rights Act, etc. When
section 2 was read to require maximization, something had to give. That "something" tended
to be compactness when Democrats were drawing the lines, as North Carolina suggests. (In
North Carolina, it was apparently possible to draw an additional majority-minority district
on the southeast side of the state, but drawing the district there would have harmed the in
terests of Democrats and Democratic incumbents. Drawing a bizarrely shaped district in the
middle of the state, District 12, achieved compliance with section 2 and promoted Demo
cratic interests. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 902 (1996).) Republicans, in contrast, did not
have to face such hard choices; majority-minority districts pack Democratic voters, some
thing that is generally in keeping with the Republican's partisan strategy. It should not be
surprising, then, that Democrat-drawn districting plans were more vulnerable to invalidation
under Shaw. Indeed, a number of the least compact majority-minority districts in the country
were in North Carolina and Texas - two of the three states whose plans were challenged in
the cases Kousser offers to show an anti-l?emocrat bias. And none of the majority-minority
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claim partisanship with such confidence. Such claims now seem espe
cially unwarranted given that more recent empirical evidence suggests
that if Shaw favors either party, it probably favors the Democrats in
the long term.111 Kousser does not ignore this possibility, but he argues
that the Supreme Court overcame this potential problem by adminis
tering Shaw inconsistently - that it invalidated only the districting
plans that benefitted Democrats while upholding all racial gerryman
ders put forward by Republicans (pp. 438-39). Kousser's theory is un
dermined by Hunt v. Cromartie,112 the latest Shaw decision, which af
firms a districting plan that favors Democrats. But even at the time
Kousser was writing, there existed enough alternative explanations for
the results in the only five cases he cites to counsel against such strong
pronouncements.
Consider the two examples Kousser offers to establish that the
Court has improperly refused to invalidate Republican-created dis
tricting plans under Shaw. The first, Voinovich v. Quilter,113 provides
weak support for Kousser's thesis. The only full opinion the Supreme
Court delivered in that case prior to publication of Kousser's book,
Voinovich v. Quilter, did not involve a Shaw challenge at all and was
handed down a short time prior to Shaw. It would have been surpris
ing had the Court addressed Shaw in that decision without the benefit
of full briefing by the parties and without granting the lower court an
districts included in that list was found in Ohio or California, the states whose plans were
affirmed by the Court in Kousser's only two examples of a pro-Republican bias. See Pildes &
Niemi, supra note 48, at 565.
1 1 1 . Shaw puts at risk majority-minority districts that pack a large number of racial mi
norities. If existing voting patterns prevail, that packing leads to the concentration of a large
number of Democrats into a district. Packing racial minorities is a well-known technique of
partisan gerrymanders, particular those done by Republicans. See CAIN, supra note 33, at
170-71. And it is not a coincidence that the bulk of the country's majority-minority districts
were drawn at the behest of the Republican Department of Justice. For recent articles de
bating this question, see Charles Cameron et. al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize
Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794 (1996); Bernard
Grofman & Lisa Handley, Estimating the Impact of Voting-Rights-Related Districting on
Democratic Strength in the U.S. House of Representatives, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN
THE 1 990s, at 60-61 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998); Lisa Handley et. al., Electing Minority
Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship Between Minority Percentages in
Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN
THE 1990s (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998); Kevin Hill, Does the Creation of Majority Black
Districts Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern
States, 57 J. POL. 384 (1995); David Lublin, Racial Redistricting and African-American Rep
resentation: A Critique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Rep
resentation in Congress?," 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 183, 185-86 (1999).

To be fair to Kousser, it is not clear that these data were available at the time he wrote
Colorblind Injustice. Indeed, while Kousser acknowledges that the Republicans thought that

the creation of a large number of majority-minority districts would benefit their party,
p. 439, he also notes a study suggesting that "compact districts tend to minimize the number
of seats Democrats win." P. 501 n.17.
1 12. 121 S. Ct. 1452 (2001).
113. 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
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opportunity to address the question first.114 Moreover, the decision
was unanimous, a fact that is at odds with Kousser's theory of parti
sanship.
The only other case Kousser offers to demonstrate a pattern of af
firming Republican-drawn plans is the Court's summary affirmance of
California's districting plan in De Witt v. W ilson.115 Even setting aside
the fact that at least one prominent voting rights scholar has termed
the districts affirmed in De Witt "relatively compact,"116 something that
would justify distinguishing De W itt from most of the districts invali
dated by the Court, there are a number of other explanations for this
summary affirmance. First, California's districting plan was drawn by a
nominally bipartisan redistricting commission rather than a self
interested state legislature.117 Second, the commission in California
drew lines with large building blocks - census tracts - rather than
the much smaller census blocks used in almost all of the other dis
tricting plans struck down by the Co1,1rt.11 8 Third, the timing of the de-

114. See supra text accompanying note 107. Further, the only Shaw-related ruling in
Voinovich that Kousser mentions was the Court's decision to grant, vacate, and remand a
subsequent iteration of that case after the Court rendered its decisions in Shaw II and Bush
v. Vera. See, e.g., pp. 370, 430, 446. As noted above, a GVR is quite different from a decision
to affirm a challenged districting plan. Supra text accompanying note 107.
To be fair to Kousser, it is worth noting that when the lower court eventually rejected
the Democrats' Shaw claim under the standards articulated in Bush and Shaw II, the
Supreme Court summarily affirmed. See Quilter v. Voinovich, 523 U.S. 1043 (1998), affg
mem., 981 F.Supp. 1032 (N.D. Ohio 1998). But the only Justice to disagree with this decision
was Justice Scalia, id., hardly the Justice most likely to defend the partisan interests of
Democrats.
1 15. P. 413-14. 515 U.S. 1170 (1995).
116. Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34
Haus. L. REv. 289, 313 n.124 (1997).
117. Samuel Issacharoff, Racial Gerrymandering in a Complex World: A Reply to Judge
Sentelle, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1267(1996). Indeed, if one is seeking a pattern in the Court's
Shaw opinions, it is worth noting that all but one of the districting plans affirmed by the
Court under Shaw were drawn by either a court or bipartisan commission. See Pamela S.
Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731,
762 & n.114 (1998) (discussing districting plans upheld in California, Florida, and Illinois);
Charles Ogletree et al., Contemporary Challenges in Race Relations, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
129, 142 (1999). And the one case that does not fit that model
Hunt, 121 S. Ct. 1452 involved an affirmance of a plan drawn to favor Democrats.
-

118. As a brief filed on behalf of members of the Black Congressional Caucus has sug
gested, see Brief Amici Curiae of Congresswoman Corrine Brown, Congressman John
Lewis, Congresswoman Cynthia Mckinney, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee Supporting Appellants, Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452 (2001) available at
1998 WL 789668, at 12-18, the use of census blocks in drawing district lines is important for
two reasons. First, the only data generally available at the census block level is racial and
population data, see Bush, 517 U.S. at 961-62 (availability of racial data at block level "en
abled districters to make more intricate refinements on the basis of race than on the basis of
other demographic information"), whereas census tracts are at least in theory built around
communities of interest and geographic landmarks, and precincts follow local political
boundaries. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Guidelines for De
lineating Census Tracts and Block Groups 5, 10 (June 1985); Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 552

May 2001]

Morgan Kousser's Noble Dream

1329

cision may help explain this particular affirmance, coming as it did
immediately after Justice O'Connor promised that Shaw would not
lead to the invalidation of all majority-minority districts.119 Fourth, the
heavy-handed efforts by the Republican Department of Justice to
promote its maximization policy - efforts which plainly angered the
Court - may not have been present in DeWitt.120
Perhaps most significantly, Kousser too quickly discounts the pos
sibility that the inconsistencies in the administration of Shaw may be
the result of bad judging rather than bad faith.121 Countless scholars
(Cal. 1992). But see Richard T. Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation
and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1997).
Second, these units are small and manipulable, see Wilson, 823 P.2d at 571 (stating that
California contains 400,000 census blocks but only 6,000 census tracts), thereby allowing for
surgical line-drawing separating voters by race. The.ir use thus tends to result in extremely
jagged district boundaries that correspond closely to racial populations. Use of census blocks
thus dramatically increases the likelihood that a court will conclude that the lines of a district
are "unexplainable on any grounds other than race." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 631. Again, if one is
looking for a pattern to explain the Shaw cases, it is worth noting that the vast majority of
the districts invalidated by the Supreme Court were drawn using census blocks. See Shaw v.
Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 457 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Johnson v. Miller,
864 F. Supp. 1354, 1377-78 (S.D. Ga. 1994), affd, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); see also Silver v. Diaz,
522 U.S. 801 (1997), summarily affg 978 F. Supp. 96, 1 10-11, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (three
judge court); Meadows v. Moon, 521 U.S. 1113 (1997), summarily atfg 952 F. Supp. 1141,
1 147 (E.D. Va. 1997) (three-judge court). But see King v. Ill. Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp.
581, 609 (N.D. Ill. 1996), summarily affd, 519 U.S. 978 (1997).
1 19. The DeWitt affinnance came on the heels of Justice O'Connor's pronouncement in
Miller that the opinion she was joining would not result in the invalidation of every majority
minority district in the country. Miller, 515 U.S. at 928-29. The DeWitt affinnance may have
provided some solace to a Justice known for steering a middle path, as it made her claim in
Miller more believable. Indeed, in her special concurrence in Bush v. Vera, Justice O'Connor
herself cited DeWitt as evidence that "strict scrutiny [does] not apply to" all "intentionally
created majority-minority distrct[s]." Bush, 517 U.S. at 958 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. See, e.g., Shaw, 517 U.S. at 912-13; Miller, 515 U.S. at 907-08, 921-23. The opinions
issued in DeWitt do not suggest that DOJ placed the same type of pressure on California's
redistricters that it placed upon states whose legislatures were dominated by Democrats.
Compare Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d. 545 (Cal. 1992) (making no mention of significant DOJ
pressure), and DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (same), with Johnson,
864 F. Supp. at 1362-64, 1366-67 (describing extensive DOJ pressure on the Georgia General
Assembly and noting that the plan it adopted "bore all the signs of the [Justice Depart
ment's] involvement"), and Miller, 515 U.S. at 907-08, 921-23 (1995) (describing DOJ in
volvement in redistricting process with disapproval), and Shaw, 517 U.S. at 912-13 (same). If
the Supreme Court was reacting to the interference of the Department of Justice in state
redistricting efforts, the Court's decisions would reveal the type of pattern Kousser decries
due to the partisan bias of the Department of Justice rather than the partisan bias of the
Court's own members. I am grateful to Alison Caplis for bringing this pattern to my atten
tion. For an argument that hostility toward the Department of Justice has also affected case
outcomes in the context of Section 5, see Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the
Rehnquist Court, 47 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming September 2001).
121. P. 437. Kousser addresses this concern in an exchange with Michael Les Benedict.
He argues that such a claim "threatens the whole enterprise of understanding human ac
tions, because Supreme Court justices are not the only human beings capable of rationaliz
ing. Everyone is." Kousser Response at 24. Perhaps what is at stake here is merely dis
agreement on terminology. As a general matter, accusations of "partisanship" in judicial
decisionmaking generally refer to deliberate bad faith, not the ability we all have to reach a
result we personally favor while remaining convinced that our conclusions are objective. See
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have tried to make sense of Shaw and its subsidiary holdings, but none
has offered a theory that fully rationalizes and explains all of the Shaw
cases.122 Kousser's partisan-influence theory may fare as well as any
other theory (even if it is undermined by the most recent Shaw deci
sion, which affirms a districting plan that favors Democrats123). But no
one has yet provided an explanation for Shaw that has both theoretical
and predictive power. That suggests that Shaw is simply the product of
a seriously divided Court engaged in ad hoc judging as it tries to feel
its way to a coherent rationale and a manageable judicial standard.124
Consistency may not be possible until either the four to the right of
Justice O'Connor on Shaw or the four to her left enjoy a decisive ma
jority. Until then, however, Shaw claims will depend on the vote of
Justice O'Connor, who continues to steer an inevitably incoherent
middle ground.125 And even someone who believes that the Shaw line
is muddled and unsupportable might well sympathize with her efforts

Dorf & Issacharoff, supra note 100 (describing studies to this effect). If Kousser means to
accuse Justice O'Connor and the Shaw majority of deliberate, self-conscious partisan deci
sionmaking, then the evidence he offers for this conclusion is inadequate. If Kousser means
only to accuse the Shaw majority of acting in good faith but simply being unable to under
stand their own partisan motivations, then the rhetoric he employs seems unduly strong. As
Kousser himself points out, "everyone" is "capable of rationalizing"; while he should of
course censure the Court for its inadequacies, he surely could do so in gentler terms. See su
pra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
122. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in
Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2277 (1998); Pildes, supra note 30, at 2506.
123. Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1462 (2001).
124. That is certainly a story we have seen in the context of other Supreme Court voting
rights jurisprudence, including the one-person, one-vote cases and the vote-dilution cases.
The early one-person, one-vote cases failed to articulate either a clear standard or a clear
constitutional theory, as a quick look at the concurring Justices' opinions confirm. Compare
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), with Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (concurring opinions of Douglas, Clark, and Stewart). Similarly,
the Court's early vote-dilution claims do not leave one with a very clear sense of what dilu
tion is and when it is prohibited. Compare Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), with
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
125. Kousser's response to this argument, which he attributes to an "uncritical biogra
pher" (p. 437), is not persuasive. First, he argues, Justice O'Connor "has been a leader, not a
follower" because she has "writ[ten) the principal opinions in" a number of major equal pro
tection cases. P. 437. That evidence, however, simply confirms Justice O'Connor's status as
the swing vote; Supreme Court watchers know that the best way of guaranteeing that the
swing vote sticks is to assign the opinion to that Justice. And while Kousser himself refuses
to accept the characterization of Justice O'Connor as a "moderate" because her opinions
"take quite radical ideological positions," "contain strong, absolutist statements of 'color
blind individualism,' " and consistently disfavor "the minority litigant," (p. 437), Kousser
fails to acknowledge that "moderate" is a relative term here. In the context of Shaw, for ex
ample, her willingness to accept section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as a compelling state in
terest, Bush, 917 U.S. at 992 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and her insistence that race
conscious districting is at least sometimes permissible, id. at 958 (O'Connor, J., concurring),
place her squarely in the middle of the Rehnquist Court.
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to find a middle way in answering these difficult questions,126 and thus
will find Kousser's accusations of bad faith too harsh.
This leads me to my final criticism of Kousser's rhetoric. Both
because Kousser fails to engage in an explicit normative debate about
the use of race and because the language he uses to attack Shaw is so
strong, Colorblind Injustice leaves one with the distinct impression
that Shaw is an easy case, so easy that we would second-guess the mo
tives of those who think that the questions raised by this intersection
of race and politics are difficult. The book never creates enough space
for someone who may ultimately agree that Shaw is mistaken to be
concerned about the role that race plays in redistricting or to think
that broader normative principles are at stake here.127 And that is un
fortunate, for one would hope that such a powerful challenge to Shaw
would be capable of changing the minds of those in the middle of this
debate.
CONCLUSION
The dilemma of a reviewer is that one cannot simply praise a fine
book and leave it at that. And Colorblind Injustice is a very fine book
- engaging, provocative, and insightful. No matter what one thinks of
Shaw, one can only admire Kousser's passion and intellect. Kousser
has achieved great things as a historian and as an advocate, and, for all
of its flaws, Colorblind Injustice should certainly count among them.

126. For a defense of Justice O'Connor's approach, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); see especially id. at x,
xiv, 11-14, 209-27, 260-61 (defending judicial minimalism and the adoption of "incompletely
theorized agreements" even though it makes the Court vulnerable to accusations of incoher
ence or inconsistency).
127. Even Justice Brennan wrote in his agonized concurrence to United Jewish Organi
v. Carey that race-based districting "raises particularly sensitive issues of doc
trine and policy." 430 U.S. 144, 171 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Kousser dis
misses one academic's reliance on these concurrences to establish that race-conscious
districting may raise hard constitutional questions as "unconvincing." P. 500 n.4. Yet the
only support Kousser offers for this dismissal is that the scholar "does not note the subtleties
of the earlier opinions," which Kousser notably does not articulate, "or sufficiently empha
size the factual differences between Wright and Shaw," the only example of which Kousser
cites is the somewhat odd distinction he believes the Constitution draws between the inten
tionally created, race-consciously drawn "86 percent nonwhite district in [Wright] versus a 57
percent black district in [Shaw] ." P. 500 n.4.
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